As the historic 1996 Ganga Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh approaches its expiration in December 2024, the internal geopolitics of India’s water management has surged to the forefront. At the center of this debate is the state of Bihar, which argues that its developmental future and ecological health have been sacrificed for decades to maintain international diplomatic obligations.
With the treaty up for renewal, Bihar’s political leadership and environmental experts are calling for a radical shift in how the river is managed. They demand that the new agreement move beyond a simple bilateral water-sharing formula between two nations and instead adopt an inclusive, basin-wide management approach that accounts for the specific needs of upstream Indian states.
Main Facts: The 1996 Framework and the Current Crisis
The Ganga Water-Sharing Treaty, signed by then-Indian Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was hailed as a landmark in South Asian diplomacy. It established a 30-year framework for sharing the river’s flow at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal, particularly during the critical lean season from January to June.
The treaty operates on a sliding scale based on water availability at Farakka:
- Below 70,000 cusecs: India and Bangladesh each receive 50% of the flow.
- Between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh is guaranteed 35,000 cusecs, with India retaining the remainder.
- Above 75,000 cusecs: India is assured 40,000 cusecs, and Bangladesh receives the rest.
Specific guarantees exist for the month of April, the peak of the lean season, to ensure Bangladesh receives a minimum flow for its agriculture. However, the treaty includes a "consultation clause" should the flow fall below 50,000 cusecs, a situation that has occurred with increasing frequency due to climate change and upstream diversions.
For Bihar, the "middleman" state between the upper riparian states (Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh) and the Farakka Barrage, the treaty has become a source of perceived injustice. Bihar’s leadership argues that while the state contributes significantly to the Ganga’s volume through its tributaries, it is restricted from utilizing that water to meet its own growing demands for irrigation, industry, and drinking water.
Chronology: A Decades-Old Grievance
The tension between Bihar’s needs and the international treaty is not a recent development but the result of a long historical trajectory:
- 1961–1975: The construction of the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. Originally designed to flush silt from the Hooghly River to save the Kolkata Port, the project was criticized by hydrologists even before its completion.
- 1994: The Second Bihar State Irrigation Commission report is published, highlighting that Bihar possesses only 16% of the Ganga’s catchment area but is forced to provide a disproportionate amount of the flow required at Farakka.
- December 1996: The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty is signed. Bihar’s concerns are largely sidelined in favor of national diplomatic interests.
- 1997: The Bihar government formally demands that upstream states (Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand) share the burden of maintaining the Ganga’s flow, rather than Bihar bearing the brunt of the delivery obligation.
- 2017: During the "Vision Ganga" programme, Bihar’s leadership highlights the "national duty" burden, noting that the river’s entry flow at Buxar is significantly lower than the volume Bihar is expected to deliver at Farakka.
- 2018: An IIT Kanpur study commissioned by the Bihar government confirms that the Farakka Barrage has caused massive siltation upstream, directly impacting Bihar’s topography and flood vulnerability.
- 2022: Bihar launches the Ganga Water Supply Scheme, but with the caveat that it can only draw water during the monsoon months (July to October), leaving it vulnerable during the lean season.
- August 2024: As the treaty nears its end, Sanjay Jha, MP from the Janata Dal (United), raises the issue in the Rajya Sabha, signaling that Bihar will not accept a "status quo" renewal.
Supporting Data: The Hydrological Burden
The core of Bihar’s argument lies in the disparity between what it receives and what it must provide. According to data from the Bihar State Pollution Control Board, the Ganga’s flow at Chausa (Buxar), where it enters the state, can drop to as low as 400 cusecs during the lean period (February to April). By the time it reaches Kahalgaon in eastern Bihar, the flow increases to approximately 1,600 cusecs due to contributions from Bihar’s own tributaries.
However, under the international treaty, India is often obligated to ensure a flow of over 50,000 cusecs at the Farakka Barrage. This creates a "hydrological squeeze." Bihar’s leaders point out that approximately a dozen rivers within the state—including the Kosi, Gandak, and Sone—join the Ganga, effectively acting as the primary feeders for the water India sends to Bangladesh.
Furthermore, the issue of siltation provides a grim statistical outlook. The IIT Kanpur study led by Professor Rajiv Sinha found that the Farakka Barrage triggers the siltation of approximately 156 million tonnes (MT) of sediment annually. This sediment does not reach the delta; instead, it settles in the riverbeds of Bihar. This has raised the riverbed, reduced the water-carrying capacity of the channel, and led to more frequent and devastating floods, even during years of average rainfall.
Official Responses and Political Stances
The political climate in Bihar is currently unified on this issue, crossing party lines. Sanjay Jha, representing the ruling Janata Dal (United), stated in Parliament that renewing the treaty without incorporating Bihar’s water security would be "harmful to the state’s broader interests." He emphasized that the Ganga basin is the lifeblood of Bihar’s agriculture and industrial aspirations.
Nitish Kumar, the Chief Minister of Bihar, has long advocated for a "proportionate" responsibility model. His administration’s stance is that the Central Government must ensure that upstream states in the upper basin do not indiscriminately divert water, leaving Bihar to fulfill the entire national obligation to Bangladesh.
Conversely, some water experts offer a more nuanced view. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator at the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), suggests that the Bihar government’s claims of "pressure" regarding minimum flow lack sufficient external evidence. Thakkar notes that since Bihar lacks major dams or storage facilities on the Ganga itself, the state currently has no physical mechanism to "hold back" water even if it wanted to.
However, Professor Rajiv Sinha of IIT Kanpur supports the state’s concern regarding the treaty’s scope. "Renewal of the Ganga Waters Sharing Treaty without considering Bihar’s concerns related to siltation, erosion, and water availability will be a foolish act," Sinha told Mongabay-India. He argues that Bihar must be made a formal stakeholder in the negotiations.
Implications: A New Paradigm for Water Diplomacy
The upcoming renewal of the treaty carries significant implications for regional stability, environmental sustainability, and federal relations within India.
1. The Shift to Basin-Wide Management
Experts like Sunil Kumar Chaudhary, a former professor at Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University, argue that the "bilateral release model" is outdated. The implication is that a modern treaty must look at the entire Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. If Bihar is to be allocated a specific quantum of water—currently, the state seeks 2,000 cusecs for drinking and industry but may only be allocated 900 cusecs—the treaty must define where that water comes from in the upper reaches.
2. The Siltation Clause
Perhaps the most significant implication for the 2024 renewal is the potential inclusion of a Silt Management Clause. If the treaty remains focused solely on water volume (cusecs) and ignores sediment (tonnes), Bihar will continue to face rising riverbeds and flood risks. A treaty that mandates joint silt management between India and Bangladesh could force the Central Government to invest in large-scale dredging and sustainable sediment bypass technologies at Farakka.
3. Diplomatic Constraints
India finds itself in a delicate position. Relations with neighbors are a priority for New Delhi’s "Neighborhood First" policy. Drastically reducing the water flow to Bangladesh to satisfy Bihar’s domestic demands could strain ties with Dhaka. However, ignoring Bihar’s demands could lead to internal political friction, especially given the state’s importance in the national political landscape.
4. Long-term Water Security
As Bihar’s population grows and its climate becomes more volatile, the state’s reliance on the Ganga will only increase. The current "monsoon-only" usage restriction on projects like the Gaya and Rajgir drinking water schemes is seen as a temporary fix. A renewed treaty that grants Bihar lean-season rights would allow for more stable urban planning and agricultural diversification.
Conclusion
The 1996 Ganga Water-Sharing Treaty was a product of its time—a diplomatic solution to a brewing international conflict. However, 30 years of hydrological data and environmental changes have shown that a river cannot be managed by looking at a single point (Farakka) in isolation.
As the 2024 deadline looms, Bihar’s demand is clear: the treaty must evolve. Whether through a "Silt Management Clause" or a redefined sharing formula that includes upstream responsibilities, the next iteration of the agreement will determine whether the Ganga remains a source of life or a catalyst for internal and international strife. The resolution will require a sophisticated balance of "water diplomacy" abroad and "water justice" at home.
